




Where are we going? 




This article looks at the role of format television in the People’s Republic of China. It 
juxtaposes two key ideas: the ‘one format policy’ and the One Child Policy. Both are 
government restrictions intended to kerb reproduction. Formats provide a means for the 
reproduction of programming ideas, that is, they are generative. When formats ‘fit’ cultural 
understandings they can be remarkably successful, as with family oriented formats. Yet there 
is something unusual about China: in comparison to many international markets, China offers 
a unique demographic – those people born after 1978. The article examines a formatted 
programme called Where Are We Going, Dad?, introduced into China from South Korea, 
which illustrates a subgenre known as the ‘parent-child caring’ (qinzi) format. The article 
shows how this genre has capitalised on the interest in the health and future well-being of the 









Most readers will be aware of the Chinese government’s restriction on reproduction, the 
One Child Policy. The policy was devised in 1978 as a way to control the nation’s 
population, which had spiralled out of control in the 1950s and 1960s. It was finally 
rescinded in 2016.  
 
The One Child Policy exhibits an indirect historical link to the Chinese television industry. 
The year that the policy came into effect, 1978, Chinese television programming began to 
develop after being stalled due to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). In the 
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following decades, channels proliferated as television viewing became a focal point of 
peoples’ everyday lives. For children with no brothers and sisters to play with, the television 
was a source of entertainment, only later displaced by electronic games. It’s not surprising 
that programmes dedicated to childhood emerged, even though most of the focus in the past 
has been on animation. Many television programmes now address the only child (within the 
family); this in turn has generated the ‘parentchild caring’ (qinzi) format, the subject of this 
article. 
 
From an initial trickle in the late 1990s, entertainment formats began to flood into 
China. Formats now provide channels with an alternative to buying canned (finished) foreign 
shows, which inevitably have to run the censorship gamut. Western programmes in particular 
require dubbing or subtitling; sometimes parts of a programme deemed offensive will be 
erased. Formats are entertainment based, easily localised and for this reason not likely to 
cause as much conflict with censors as canned programmes. By definition, formats only 
become such when they are adapted outside of their country of origin. As Jean Chalaby 
(2016) writes, ‘The format industry rests on a compelling premise: the willingness of 
broadcasters to pay for the outsourcing of risk’ (p. 12) (emphasis in original). 
 
The role played by imported television formats in China has been the subject of several 
studies in English over the past two decades, the earliest account being by Keane 
(2002). Other publications have followed (De Burgh et al., 2011; Fung and Zhang, 2011; 
Keane, 2004, 2015; Keane and Liu, 2009; Keane et al., 2007; Moran and Keane, 2006; 
Zhang and Fung, 2014). Several studies have considered elements of reality television and 
fandom; for instance, studies of Hunan Satellite TV’s (HSTV) Supergirls, itself a clone of 
Pop Idol (Huang, 2014; Meng, 2009; Wu, 2014; Yang, 2009) or Jiangsu Satellite’s If You Are 
the One (Kong, 2013). Other studies have looked at reality-style television shows from the 
perspective of educating people about modern lifestyle choices (Lewis et al., 2012, 2016). 
By this time, entertainment formats arrived from Europe and the United Kingdom in the early 
2000s Chinese producers had accepted the concept of televised reality (Keane, 
2015). At the height of the format boom (from 2010 to 2013) competition-style formats were 
entering the market from Europe and the United Kingdom, with companies like 
FremantleMedia operating as intermediaries. In 2013, satellite channels were screening 
13 different music talent shows at the same time, most based on imported formats.1 In 
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2013, four satellite channels, Hunan, Zhejiang, Dragon and Jiangsu Satellite TV (JSTV), 
imported a total of 21 music and dance formats from the Netherlands, Britain, United 
States, Korea and Spain (Keane, 2015). 
 
On 20 October 2013, the State Administration of Press Publicity Radio, Film and 
Television (hereafter SAPPRFT) introduced China’s ‘one format policy’ as a way to restrict 
the over-population of lookalike ‘singing’ talent shows that were coming into 
China through the format ‘open door’, and then being cloned, that is, artificially reproduced 
by rival stations (Global Times, 2013). The regulations applied to China’s satellite 
broadcasters and were in part intended to restrict the entry of foreign business into the 
Chinese media market. The SAPPRFT rules, which still exist, restrict each satellite channel to 
importing just one format each year, with the extra constraint that it cannot be broadcast 
during prime time (7:30 to 10:00 p.m.). The only exceptions to this rule are music talent 
shows approved by SAPPRFT, and a limit of four of these per year was proscribed. In the 
lead up to this crackdown, however, the country of origin changed; formats were now 
entering China via South Korea more so than through the Western door, capitalising on the 
Korean Wave (hanliu) and immediately striking a cultural chord with audiences, young and 
not so young. It is this entry of South Korea into the format exporting business that we will 
explore. 
 
The programme that we focus on in this article is Where Are We Going, Dad? (baba 
qu na’er?), perhaps the most successful qinzi format. The article begins with some 
background discussion of the formatting of programmes in China, the Japanese origins of 
certain popular entertainment and reality formats, and South Korea’s late entry into the 
format business. We then examine the generational cohort addressed by some of the leading 
formatted programmes targeted at the One Child Generation, including If You 
Are the One, a successful dating programme produced by Jiangsu Satellite TV (Keane, 
2015; Kong, 2013).While If You Are the One is a sophisticated and often contentious 
programme directed at young adults, it provides a useful entry into the discussion of 
Where Are We Going, Dad? in which five celebrity fathers and their sons or daughters are 
placed in out-of-the-way locations with the focus on how the pairs bond as they encounter a 
series of tasks. Arguably a hybrid of Survivor, Trading Places and I’m a 
Celebrity, Get Me out of Here, Where Are We Going, Dad? is a cleverly executed sociodrama 
of today’s fragmented society. As we discuss in the final section, the programme ran for three 
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seasons until it was abruptly terminated due to a policy change that sought to protect 
impressionable children (those featured in the show) from the effects of media celebrity. This 
genre actually has a longer title – the ‘celebrity offspring travel survival experience reality 
show’ (mingxing qinzi luxing shengcun tiyan zhenrenxiu). As the name suggests, the format 
makes use of celebrity branding, as well as tourism experiences, offering the Chinese 
audience a chance to identify with faraway places. As we will demonstrate in our discussion 
of one of the overseas ‘special episodes’, shooting in overseas ‘exotic locations’ can be 
construed as an element of Chinese soft power and ‘ticks the box’ of Chinese media 
internationalising (‘going out’). 
 
 
From serial viewing to revolving formats 
 
Before discussing the breakout success of this regional genre, it is worth providing somebrief 
background on the Chinese television industry and its audience. Chinese people first 
encountered the medium of television broadcasting on 1 May 1958. In retrospect, television 
was a bit of a disappointment. Radio was king in the 1950s, routinely regaling people from 
loudspeakers set up across the nation. Television would take some time to gain the 
ascendency. Programming over the ensuing three decades was didactic and propaganda 
laden, mostly comprising serials and news broadcasts, as the nation lurched from years of 
conflict with Japan, its own civil war, the chaos of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–1976) and then the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping. The 1980s witnessed a 
massive increase in the number of channels along with decentralisation policies that 
permitted local stations greater autonomy in programme scheduling (see Keane, 2015). 
 
Decentralisation was just the beginning of media reform. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed 
that media, except for selected Communist Party propaganda mouthpieces, needed to become 
even more self-reliant. For many television stations, aspiring to build audience numbers and 
tap into advertising revenue, Deng’s edict was a green light to buy content from abroad, 
particularly serial dramas from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Viewers in many parts of China 
became familiar with programmes from places as far away as Latin America (Hong, 1998). A 
temporary setback occurred in 1994 when the government imposed a prime time quota on 
imports, which was intended to ‘protect’ audiences from inappropriate foreign programmes 
while stimulating local producers to make better programmes (Keane, 2015). 
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By the mid-1990s a proliferation of satellite channels with national coverage had ushered in a 
commercial mentality. Each of China’s 28 provinces and five autonomous regions was 
allowed one satellite channel. Suddenly the competitive stakes were higher. 
Producers and programme buyers at Chinese television trade fairs looked for content that was 
cheap, familiar to audiences and attractive. Serials were still much sought after but 
Chinese television was more than ever open to foreign commercial strategies. The problem 
was ‘know-how’: how can you make entertaining programmes with limited financial 
resources? 
 
It was not surprising that producers looked to borrow international ideas. The television 
format would ultimately become a Trojan Horse, ushering new ideas into China; some fell 
afoul of regulators, others failed to impress audiences, and many were modified to 
accommodate audience tastes. Inevitably, the competitive values inherent in international 
‘super-formats’ like Survivor, Who Wants to be a Millionaire? and The Weakest 
Link (Chalaby, 2016) were deemed inappropriate. Talent competitions became the default 
setting and evening schedules started to resemble singing–dancing format wallpaper. 
In October 2013, the government reacted and a new stipulation limiting the import of 
overseas formats, and in particular talent show formats, came into force. Only one singing 
show was permitted in prime time (7:30 to 10:00 p.m.). Those responsible for programming 
decisions now had to be more circumspect in order to avoid the ire of censors, worried about 
the impact of ‘western-style’ competition formats. A number of shows in preparation were 
aborted. JSTV, which already had made headlines with If You Are the 
One aborted the second season of Celebrity Battle (quanneng xingzhan). With the crackdown 
orders on so-called excessive entertainment (xianyu ling) biting into scheduling plans, 
broadcasters had to find a new way. 
 
The qinzi genre was the answer, a way to appease authorities and capture audiences. 
It was introduced from outside China, or at least the most successful examples were. 
Stories that embrace the family unit would appear to make sense in a Confucian culture rather 
than winner-take-all-type contests spiced up by conniving among contestants. The 
family/children format had its genesis in East Asia and this is where the South Korean 
influence is obvious. ‘Cultural proximity’ based on history (Straubhaar, 1991) suggests that 
the two countries can be strong collaborators in media production; for instance, 





The interest in licensing and imitating Asian-originated formats is quite recent, that is, if we 
discount a few notable exceptions. In 1988, Shanghai Television initiated a segment of its 
variety show Zhengda zongheng as The Great Knowledge Tide (zhili da chonglang), which 
saw a panel of minor celebrities and educators fielding questions while allowing participation 
from members of the audience. In 1990, China Central Television (CCTV) took over 
production and rebranded it as the Zhengda Variety Show (zhengda zongyi), adding a 
‘window on the world’ element. The programme investor, the Zhengda Company, had 
acquired the copyright of a Taiwanese infotainment show called Run around the 
Earth (raozhe diqiu pao), which featured a female host who travelled around the world 
filming different social customs. This was integrated into the Chinese version along with 
audience participation and for this reason the Zhengda Variety Show is generally regarded as 
China’s first format acquisition (Keane, 2015). The Zhengda Variety Show holds the record 
for the longest continuous programme, changing its format with the times. 
 
 
Japan: format brokers in Asia 
 
The first country in Asia to bank on the value of formatting was Japan. Its travelling formats 
included The Iron Chef (ryouri no tetsujin), Happy Family Plan (shiawase 
kazuko keikaku) and Future Diary (mirai nikki) (Iwabuchi, 2004). Previously, Japan had 
achieved international success through animation products such as Astro Boy and 
Pokémon. According to Iwabuchi, Japan began selling formats to the Netherlands in 
1987, an example is the format known as Wakuwaku in Japan or (exciting) Animal Land in 
Holland. By the late 1990s, Japanese formats were on the move, finding new markets in East 
Asia as well as Europe. 
 
Interestingly, South Korea began its venture into formats by copying Japanese programmes. 
Dong-Hoo Lee (2004) notes that Japanese programmes were seen as a way to adapt elements 
of American production ‘know-how’ already assimilated into the Japanese television industry 
(Iwabuchi, 2004). Because of a ban on Japanese entertainment programmes in the 1990s due 
to the legacy of wartime hostilities between the two nations, it was expedient for Korean 
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producers to simply copy Japanese shows. The 1990s saw many cases of suspected 
plagiarism and various degrees of imitation, sometimes euphemistically referred to in the 
industry as ‘emulation’. Shows involving the family were a good cultural fit in a market like 
South Korea. Lee writes about one of the shows that made a big splash from 1997 to 1999, 
called Special Task! Dad’s Challenge, a clone of Tokyo Broadcasting System’s (TBS) Happy 
Family Plan. The concept involved the family members helping the patriarch accomplish 
tasks. A task was assigned and the father had a week to prepare. The tasks included feats of 
memory and acrobatic skills, tricks like balancing an egg on one’s head. Iwabuchi (2004) 
notes that the similarities between the two were so close that some of the tasks shown on the 
Japanese version would appear in the Korean show weeks later. It was not until the late 1990s 
that Korean channels started paying licence fees, the programme being Fuji TV’s Boys and 
Girls in Love. As the Korean industry turned its attention to buying formats, charges of 
plagiarism decreased (Lee, 2004). 
 
Happy Family Plan was licenced to Beijing Television (BTV) by TBS in 2002. BTV had an 
existing relationship with TBS through its acquisition of Wakuwaku Animal Land (Iwabuchi, 
2004). BTV subsequently retitled their version Dreams Come True (mengxiang 
chengzhen). Whereas in the Japanese and Korean version the father took on the role of 
contestant and was aided in preparation by the family members, the tasks in the BTV 
programme were shared among family members. As with successful formats elsewhere in 
China, it was not long before other stations began cloning, cashing in on the success of the 
original. Stations in Sichuan and Zhejiang provinces even used the same title and 
TBS issued a complaint to the Chinese media regulator, then known as State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT), and to the Ministry of Culture, 
seeking to control this ‘infringement’. However, the most they could hope for was trademark 




South Korea: riding the wave 
 
The tide turned in 2013. South Korea landed two significant licenced programmes into the 
Chinese market. The first, I am a Singer (wo shi geshou), was a talent elimination contest 
with live audience voting; the second was Where Are We Going, Dad? (baba 
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qu na’er?). Both were developed and distributed by the Munhwa Broadcasting 
Corporation (MBC) to HSTV; interestingly, both were elements of South Korea MBC’s long 
running variety show Sunday Night, which was already attracting a large Chinese online 
audience. A third South Korean show with an avid following, Running Man 
(benpaoba xiondi), was localised by Zhejiang Satellite Television (ZJSTV) a yearlater. Of 
these, Where Are We Going, Dad? was the only true qinzi format. But more would follow. 
 
South Korean formats have set the benchmark in cultural proximity terms by embracing 
traditional East Asian values. Yet rather than just adhering to a conventional 
Confucian social structure, Korean pop culture is playing with stereotypes. This is evident in 
much of the Korean Wave, a tide of creative culture that began in the late 1990s (Chua, 2012; 
Chua and Iwabuchi, 2008; Kim and Rhyoo, 2007). In the movie My Sassy Girl (2001), the 
heroine differs from the gentle and submissive stereotype of the traditional Asian woman. 
Likewise, the hit movie, My Wife is a Gangster (2001), cleverly reverses gender roles. This 
reversal has now taken place in TV, a step away from the male patriarch figure evident in 
Happy Family Plan and Special Task! Dad’s Challenge. 
 
The current wave of Korean formats embodies lifestyle elements including fashion, food 
culture and tourism. Korean aesthetic elements have in turn drawn heavily on 
Japanese Kawaii (‘cute’) culture with its modern take on fashion and youth lifestyle. 
Echoing Japanese production styles, reality shows add cartoon captions and text message to 
reinforce expressions emotions and affect. Contestants are fashionably attired and look 
attractive. In comparison to their Korean and Japanese counterparts, Chinese television 
programmes did not pay much attention to visual aesthetics, leading one of 
China’s politburo members, Wang Qishan, head of the Central Commission for 
Discipline Inspection, to opine that Korean programmes make family values more appealing 
by wrapping them in designer clothing and cool gadgets (South China 
Morning Post, 2014). 
 
Where Are We Going, Dad? 
To understand qinzi formats and the success of Where Are We Going, Dad?, we need to 
understand a little more about China’s unique demographic of single parent children. Not 
only did the One Child Policy succeed in slowing population growth, but it has led to a 
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generation with some significant psychological issues. As Shuyu Kong (2013) has pointed 
out, the pressure on the one child in the family is enormous, pressure to marry, pressure to get 
into university, pressure to get a good job, and then pressure to look after the parents. 
One programme that illustrates these challenges is called If You Are the One, developed by 
JSTV – or more correctly cloned from a show licenced by HSTV called Take Me 
Out (women yue hui ba) (for a discussion, see Keane, 2015; Kong, 2013). If You Are the 
One is a dating show format with a difference, 24 female contestants and 1 male. It is no 
doubt successful because it airs the insecurities of this One Child Generation to a studio 
audience, two professional relationship counsellors and an audience of approximately 
300 million. It has had a number of moments however when the censors’ ire has been 
aroused. When SAPPRFT cracked down on singing shows, it was also taking aim at the 
popularity of If You Are the One. While it appears tame in comparison with risqué 
international dating shows, the contestants sometimes express materialist and individualist 
ideas that run counter to socialist values. If You Are the One is China’s most successful 
overseas programme export, broadcast on Australia’s Special Broadcasting Service 
(SBS) since 2014. 
 
If You Are One speaks to the post-1980s and post-1990s generation. Females from this 
demographic are less likely to accept the traditional role of housewife. However, while there 
is pressure on the one child, there is also pressure on parents. In fact, parents are a major 
factor in urging their offspring to participate in the show, hoping that exposure might bring 
about a ‘perfect match’ (Ma, 2014). The changing expectations among generations evident on 
If You Are the One is what has made Where Are We Going, Dad? compulsive viewing, albeit 
to a slightly different audience demographic. Parents are very concerned about early 
education. They are also worried about the happiness of the children. Many debates have 
ensued in the media as well as online reflecting the constant fear of many new parents that 
they will produce spoilt children, the so-called ‘little emperors’ (Zhao and Murdock, 1996). 
 
Where Are We Going, Dad? was first broadcast on HSTV in October 2013. It was, however, 
not the first of its kind to appear in China. HSTV had previously produced a successful 
reality show called X-Change (bianxing ji) in 2006, a variation on the role swap genre, in this 
case swapping urban and rural children from one child families. The director of this show 
was subsequently called in to produce Where Are We Going, Dad? The success of Where Are 
We Going, Dad? in China is due to a range of factors. As mentioned earlier, the popularity of 
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the Korean Wave (hanliu) differentiates it from most Chinese reality shows. Audiences are 
very aware of the Korean origins and many have seen the Korean version online. A more 
important barometer of success is the fact that the father assumes the role as central caregiver. 
In China, women, often nannies and grandparents, take most responsibility for care of the 
One Child Generation. Because of this fact, audiences of Where Are We Going, Dad? are 
predominantly female and there is a great deal of bemused voyeurism of the very presentable 
males who are co-opted into duties for which they are not well equipped. Another success 
factor is tie-ins and product placements with the tourism industry (see below). Yet another 
obvious advantage is the bottom line. Compared with singing competitions, talent shows and 
dating shows, parenting/ children (qinzi) formats like Where Are We Going, Dad? have 
largely avoided problems associated with censorship, that is at least until 2016 (see below). 
And they arerelatively cost-effective to produce. For instance, the cost for having celebrities 
on Where Are We Going, Dad? is far less than the price of A-list celebrity coaches in The 
Voice of China (Zhongguo hao shengyin) which also has additional studio and production 
costs.  
 
Finally, the captive audience of carers for young people translates well into advertising 
revenue. Females and children are important demographics in China’s rapidly growing 
consumer culture. Where Are We Going, Dad?’s audience is predominantly female, 68.37% 
according to reports (Xinhua News, 2013). Compared with women in South Korea, 
Chinese women aged from 20 to 49 years are more likely to remain at least partially in the 
workforce after having children; they are expected to take on the role as a child carer. Having 
the double burdens from family and work, these young women suffer intense pressure; they 
have to compete with males in the labour market. In this sense, the husbands’ caregiving role 
in the reality show makes interesting and amusing television for women. They can find some 
gratuitous comedic relief. In some respects, the five celebrity fathers are dream husbands: a 
(former) Olympic diving champion, a Taiwanese idol singer, a model, a director and husband 
of a famous TV host, and a TV actor. These caring, empathetic, loyal, ruggedly handsome, 
and charming celebrity fathers are undoubtedly attractive to the women audience. Zhang 
Liang, the only dad in the show who could cook, found greater celebrity by just being a ‘good 
dad’ than through modelling. 
 
In fact, what adds to the appeal is its integration with digital media, not unlike most reality 
shows. Viewers share the shows with virtual friends through instant messaging 
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(IM), IM application on smart phone (WeChat) and social network services (SNS). 
Through Weibo feeds and personal blogs, viewers’ comments about the show are distributed 
to fans. Audiences can watch the programme on the television screen, on mobile and tablet 
devices as well as on the cinema screen. Where Are We Going, Dad? is shown on 
HSTV Channel’s Mango TV, as well as online sites including LeTV, Youku, Sohu online, 





Product and place endorsement are defining features of the outdoor reality experience format 
represented by Where Are We Going, Dad? Tourism attributed to the Korean 
Wave has generated windfall revenues. In particular, the Wave has seen a dramatic increase 
in the number of female tourists going to South Korea from China and Japan, increasing from 
28,909 (or 4.8% of the total number of tourists) in 1995 before the Wave, to a staggering 
314,433 (or 11.8%) in 2005 (Korea Tourism Organization, 2006, cited in 
Kim and Ryoo, 2007). Promotion of tourism has led to further collaboration between 
television networks in China and Korea. CCTV, HSTV, Sichuan TV, Dragon TV and 
Zhejiang TV have announced collaboration with Korean TV production companies and 
TV networks. After the successful experience of HSTV, Heilongjiang Province’s Daqing 
TV station is collaborating with the South Korea production company JTBC and broadcaster 
MBC to launch a reality show Most Beautiful Memory (huayang nianhua), in which the 
Chinese newlyweds will experience their honeymoon on Jeju island in South 
Korea. 
 
The use of local tourism elements and recreation activities provides a range of commercial 
tie-ins. Each episode of Where Are We Going, Dad? features a different location ranging 
from Tengger Desert in Inner Mongolia to Yunnan province in Southwest China, to Jiming 
Island in Shandong and a ski resort in Heilongjiang province bordering with 
Russia. According to the producer, this strategy has led to a dramatic rise in tourism in these 
locations (Interview with producers, Perth, 28 September 2015). Places are promoted as 
desired travel destinations for the family trip; travel agencies offer qinzi tour packages that 
feature visits to these locations. The outdoor experience element reflects the popularity of 
tourism in China. In series 2, the show visited New Zealand’s Rotorua district and Fiji. In 
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keeping to themes of personal development in such reality formats, the celebrities get down 
and dirty, cooking and cleaning as well as doing mundane tasks while endorsing products and 
places. There is ample scope for propaganda and public service messages, endearing the 
show to the government: for instance, the need to look after cultural relics and respect 
property. The 72-hour rural ‘experience’ of smelly toilets and a lack of modern appliances, 
brings these distant parents closer to their sons and daughters, who in turn become the real 
branded celebrities of the programme, with their own product endorsements and websites. 
The children, aged between 4 and 6, who have lived in apartments looked after by nannies 
and their grandmothers, all receive English names. The fathers, now reintroduced to paternal 
responsibility and Confucian values, exhibit loving embraces, despite inevitable tantrums. 
 
By 2015, at the time of writing, the programme was in its third series, still featuring well-
known destinations in China such as a rainforest in Xishuangbanna (Yunnan) and northwest 
grasslands in Urumqi (Xinjiang Province). In August 2015, the production team and cast 
visited the Margaret River region, 240 km south of Perth, the provincial capital of Western 
Australia, sometimes called the most remote capital city on the planet. The collaboration was 
instigated by the West Australian Tourism authority, which had previously approached 
HSTV about making a travel documentary. According to the director, the idea of making 
another offshore episode of Baba grew from this conversation (Interview with producer, 
Perth, 28 September 2015). The theme of the two episodes filmed in Margaret River is ‘Back 
to the Stone Age’, an interesting choice considering that Margaret River is a tourist region 
known for film festivals, wineries, bushwalking and surfing. Nevertheless, the intent was to 
locate the contestants in a pure organic environment. The region is adjacent to the Indian 
Ocean with ample bush, stunning flora and an abundance of native fauna. The celebrity kids 
and farmers visited farms, the beach and played with kangaroos. In addition, they also visited 
wineries, tapping in on the growing penchant of Chinese to drink wine. Local film services 
assisted with the shoots, even assisting with recruiting an ‘Australian mermaid’ into the 
action, an addition that was as bemusing to the locals as characterising Margaret River as the 
Stone Age. 
 
The overseas episodes of Where Are We Going, Dad? are about more than just catering to the 
tourist market. Since the mid-2000s, China’s media has been encouraged to ‘go out’, a term 
referring to internationalisation. For many Chinese media producers, it is very hard to break 
into international media markets because the content produced is either too culturally specific 
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or too propagandist. An exception is the abovementioned dating show If You Are the One. 
This raises an interesting observation about format trade in China. First, the format is 
obviously a way for foreign companies to enter the Chinese market, and second they are a 
way for Chinese companies to show that they are responding to the government’s ‘going out’ 
strategy, even if this is only overseas location shooting. If You Are the One has also played 
this overseas game with social episodes featuring guests from overseas countries, usually 
Chinese nationals living overseas seeking a partner. At the same time as Where Are We 
Going, Dad? was filming in Margaret River, If You Are the One was shooting Australian 
segments for its down under special, following on from a previous New Zealand special. 
 
 
Qinzi variations, copycats and spin-offs 
 
Unlike the One Child Policy, a format can spawn numerous offspring, although as indicated 
above the Chinese regulators have sought to control the kinds of formats allowed to multiply. 
The question of how long a format’s life is depends on reception. One of the risks of the 
trade, Chalaby (2016) says, is that a poor adaptation can instil doubt in a buyer’s mind. 
According to David Loye (1999), a programme that is new, interesting and which has some 
pull factor is likely to register a ripple in the marketplace. The ripple effect will then result in 
imitation whereby competitors are compelled to replicate, sometimes adding new novel 
elements but at the same time contributing to market saturation, eventually leading to 
progressive degradation of the idea, that is, audience boredom and satiation. This 
phenomenon is evident in China with the government now stepping in to rectify the market. 
According to an investigation by China Youth Daily and sohu.com in 
May 2013, 64.7% of viewers thought there are too many singing programmes, with 44% 
expressing dissatisfaction about the homogenisation of offerings (Xiong, 2013). 
 
Despite the restrictions imposed, the qinzi format has become ‘generative’ in the 
Chinese market, in both licenced and illegal spin-offs; it has produced a variety of subgenres 
and variations, generally incorporating family and ethics. In particular, Where Are 
We Going, Dad?’s popularity has inspired copycat shows by provincial satellite TV channels. 
Parenting relations shows are now a feature of Chinese television. More than 
23 qinzi reality shows emerged in 2014 alone. While many are copycats, some have 
embraced local content with creativity and originality. For example, the online video sharing 
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site iQIYI.com created episodes in the form of short interviews with celebrity fathers on how 
to educate their children. The national broadcaster, CCTV has collaborated with the UK 
production Super Nanny. International Programme Content Network 
(IPCN), the Chinese distributor of Super Nanny, claimed the show averaged 20 million 
viewers per episode (Burrell, 2014). Elsewhere, Zhejiang Radio Satellite TV’s Dad is 
Back (baba, hui lai le) ‘borrowed’ another format idea from Korean Broadcasting 
System’s (KBS) (Korea) The Return of Superman, in which celebrity dads take care of their 
children for 48 hours. The fascination with how celebrity fathers cope with the responsibility 
led to another Korean format spin-off devised by CJ E&M, called Granddads (huayang 
yeye), ostensibly about how grandfathers bond with and teach their grandchildren good social 
values: this is currently licenced to Shanghai’s Dragon TV. The First Time (rensheng diyi ci), 
an adaptation of a Japanese format by ZJSTV in 2013, added Chinese elements of parents and 
children travelling together to learn Kung Fu. 
 
Another show that cashes in on the One Child parenting craze is Beijing Satellite TV’s 
Mum, Listen to Me (mama ting wo shuo), in which a panel of precocious young children 
evaluate the performance of mothers. During the show, three children talk about their 
mothers who are made to walk on to a T-shape stage reminiscent of If You Are the One. 
The jury of 20 is made up of 5- to 10-year-old children who learn something about the family 
issue in question through watching video clips, once again a similar mode of presentation to 
If You Are the One. The similarity even extends to the host, the bald headed psychologist, Le 
Jia, who was poached from JSTV’s If You Are the One to front this show. The children can 
question the mother following the screening of each video clip. As they learn more about 
each mother, children vote and determine the right or the wrong of the matter. 
 
HSTV has exploited the format franchise Where Are We Going, Dad? by investing in a 
movie of the same name in 2014 and 2015, taking highlights of seasons 1 and 2. 
Produced by an HSTV affiliated production company Tianyu Media, the first iteration of 
Where Are We Going, Dad? generated massive box office revenues. The format has also had 
a life as an animation, exclusively distributed on Hunan’s own Mango Internet TV 
(hunantv.com) and Hunan TV Golden Eagle Cartoon Channel in May 2014. 
Yet even as the Korean momentum was building, the government was moving to thwart its 
progress. In 2015, SAPPRFT issued a revised ‘excess reality order’ (xian zhen ling), that took 
effect at the beginning of 2016. Among its directives is a restriction of 
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Korean formats and influences. The key point is that Chinese television stations are 
encouraged to come up with their own ideas, be more creative and enterprising, and move 
away from ‘excessive entertainment’. 
 
 
Concluding remarks: the One Child Policy and the one format policy 
 
Television formats are a means of outsourcing risk, following the principle that these 
programmes are road-tested in other territories. Should the success or failure of television 
shows therefore be left to the audience? This raises the question of whether or not regulatory 
interventions by SAPPRFT enhance the creativity of the industry or engender a loss of 
confidence. As for the ‘reproducibility’ of formats, should they self-regulate or be 
eugenically controlled? If they are over-populating and producing homogeneity, how should 
they be managed? In China, it seems that the government is willing to step into the market 
just as they have by controlling women’s reproduction. A recent reversion however may 
change the demographic makeup of China over time. In 2015, the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party suddenly 
announced the end of the One Child Policy. Part of the rationale for rescinding the 35-year-
old edict is stimulation of the economy, arguably something that producers of reality TV 
shows have been doing. 
 
In this article, we have addressed the productive link between Korean culture and formats in 
China, showing how a sea change occurred, bringing more productions from China’s near 
neighbour at the same time as the government regulator SAPPRFT cracked down on 
entertainment formats and their clones. In fact, a shift in production away from crude talent 
shows towards educational and qinzi formats was a market response to SAPPRFT’s criticism 
of gross commercialism and erosion of social values reportedly displayed in some of the 
segments of If You Are the One. Yet the qinzi format, like many before it fell afoul of the 
regulators. In 2016, the SAPPRFT suddenly announced that the days of television 
programmes exposing children to excessive media scrutiny were numbered. The aim of the 
ban, according to the state-run news agency, Xinhua, is to protect ‘impressionable’ children 
from the pitfalls of ‘overnight fame’ (Qin, 2016). While this edict obviously makes a great 
deal of sense, it should be noted that these shows have served a valuable role of educating 
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people about child-rearing practices and drawing attention to the need for the males in the 
nuclear family to take more responsibility. 
 
Because of the One Child Policy, qinzi genres have deeper social implications for audiences 
in Mainland China. The question remains, why wasn’t this concept discovered 
in China? The fact that the show was introduced via South Korea demonstrates the role that 
formats play in opening up Chinese television to new kinds of programming. Where 
Are We Going, Dad?’s success in South Korea and its following by Chinese online viewers 
created the conditions for its introduction into China, as has been the case with other 
transplanted Korean shows including Running Man (benpao xiongdi) and I am a Singer 
(wo shi geshou). Indeed, the success of these shows in China has added the TV format trade 
as another element to the Korean Wave. In the process while China’s television industry is 
maturing, the government continues to address audiences like young children, worried that 
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1. These included Zhejiang Satellite TV’s The Voice of China (Zhongguo hao shengyin), 
Dragon TV’s Chinese Idol (Zhongguo meng zhi sheng), Hunan Satellite TV’s X Factor 
(Zhongguo zuiqiang yin) and Happy Boys (kuaile nansheng), Hubei Satellite TV’s Superstar 
China (wode Zhongguo xing), Tianjin Satellite TV’s Copycat Singers (tianxia wushuang), 
Anhui Satellite TV’s Mad for Music (wo wei ge kuang), Shandong Satellite TV’s Cpop Star 
(Zhongguo xing liliang) and Jiangxi Satellite TV’s (Zhongguo hong ge hui). 
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